About the
(ISC)² Blog

« SIEM ROI - How to prove it? | Main | Merchant Level 2 SAQ or ROC »

26 September 2010


This may be a bit of a rant, but, now that the dust has settled a bit, it probably would be a good idea to assess what Stuxnet means going forward for us in the Security community. While it is not the end of the world it definitely made cyber warfare or just plain physical sabotage using software a lot more realistic.

Just my two cents about this, this comes pretty close to the scenario from an old Tom Clancy Ops-Room novel. Those of us who have been involved in risk assessments have often been accused by management of tell nightmare stories. How many times have you heard. "This is a secure network so we don't to implement x y or z." That is bad enough when they claim the firewalls are good enough to justify weak passwords, but when the network was physically isolatee you tended to let them have their way.

The main lesson I am taking from this is that the simple controls that we have all forced on our networked colleagues are now strongly recommended for "secure networks" too. I mean things like strong passwords, change the vendor default passwords and keep your OS's up to date. Someone reintroduced virus distibution through sneakerware.

I like to say "know who your enemies are." but this time it really has demonstrated how vulnerable we are with so many uncontrolled devices out there, and I really mean embedded OSes on devices that never were meant to be updated or to have security built in, factory robots, SCADAs, DCMs. It is not the end of the world, and I suppose we should be thankful for the work, but it seems like a sisyphus parody.

Stuxnet is a game changer just like Nimda and Slammer were, but it is a bit worse because the playing field is not just the Internet and corporate intranets, it really is everywhere now. It makes my head hurt just to think of it.

The comments to this entry are closed.

Recent Contributors

Past Contributors